Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions

Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions

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Overview

This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.


The expert contributions are underpinned by the notion of moving economic thinking away from the analysis of the logic of a situation given a set of well-established and well-enforced ‘rules of the game’, towards a deeper analysis of the logic behind the selection of the rules of the game themselves. Within this context, the theme of choice between rules (as well as the more conventional analysis within rules) across historical time and place, and in various thought experiments and conceptual situations, is explored in detail. Extensive case studies back theory with empirical evidence, and topics discussed include: the foundations of constitutional economics; constitutional political economy; political competition and voting; public choice and public policy; and extensions to public choice theory.


This stimulating book will prove a thought-provoking read for academics and both under- and post-graduate students in the fields of economics (particularly public choice and Austrian economics), public policy and political science.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781781003961
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Publication date: 07/13/2013
Pages: 384
Product dimensions: 6.10(w) x 9.20(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author

Edited by Francisco Cabrillo, Department of Applied Economics, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain and Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro, Department of Applied Economics, University of Valencia, Spain

Table of Contents

Contents:


Foreword

Peter Boettke


Introduction

Francisco Cabrillo and Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro


PART I: FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

1. Presuppositions in the Evaluation of Rules

James M. Buchanan


2. Buchanan, Hobbes and Contractarianism: The Supply of Rules?

Geoffrey Brennan and Giuseppe Eusepi


PART II: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CASE STUDIES

3. Economic Governance in the European Union. A Problem of Legitimacy

Francisco Cabrillo and Sean Fitzpatrick


4. Early Spanish Liberalism and Constitutional Political Economy: The Cádiz Constitution of 1812

Roger D. Congleton


5. Reforms and Decentralization: Friends or Foes?

Pierre Salmon


6. Democracy-Preserving Institutions: The Quasi-federal System of South Africa

Giorgio Brosio


PART III: POLITICAL COMPETITION AND VOTING

7. On Machiavelli′s Conspiracy Paradoxes

Manfred J. Holler


8. A General Measure of the ‘Effective’ Number of Parties in a Political System

Vani K. Borooah


9. Party Competition and Electoral Turnout: Downs’s Calculus in a Multiparty System

Juha Helin and Hannu Nurmi


PART IV: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC POLICY

10. The Political Economy of Dutch Disease: A Survey

Martin Paldam


11. Higher Education as Private Good and as Quasi Public Good: The Case of Italy

Silvia Fedeli and Francesco Forte


12. The Actual Role of Government Intervention for the Recovery of the Italian Economy

Gian Cesare Romagnoli


13. Government Bankruptcy of Balkan Nations and the Consequences for Money and Inflation Before 1914: A Comparative Analysis

Peter Bernholz


PART V: EXTENSIONS IN PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY

14. Regulator Preferences and Lobbying Efforts in Rent-seeking Contests

Juan D. Montoro-Pons


15. Cooperation in Multilateral PDs: Self-selected vs. Pre-defined Groups

Viktor J. Vanberg


16. Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro


17. Awards Play an Important Role

Bruno S. Frey and Susanne Neckermann


18. The Optimal Babel: An Economic Framework for the Analysis of Dynamic Language Rights

Bengt-Arne Wickström


19. A Theory of Conversion to Exclusive Religions and Political Faiths

Mario Ferrero


Index

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