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Edward Elgar Publishing
Economics of Antitrust Law

Economics of Antitrust Law

by Benjamin Klein, Andres V. LernerBenjamin Klein


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This insightful two-volume set presents a careful selection of the most important published papers on the economics of antitrust law. The collection focuses on areas of major importance including market power, horizontal arrangements, and vertical arrangements and exclusionary behaviour. It includes seminal papers on topics such as oligopoly and collusion, horizontal mergers and joint ventures, exclusive dealing and tying and bundling.

The Economics of Antitrust Law will be an essential source of reference for economists, lawyers and practitioners concerned with this important and controversial area of law and economics.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781845425135
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Publication date: 06/28/2008
Series: Economic Approaches to Law Series , #18
Pages: 1312
Product dimensions: 7.10(w) x 10.00(h) x 4.10(d)

About the Author

Edited by Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner, Compass Lexecon, Los Angeles, US

Table of Contents


Volume I


Introduction The Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner


1. Harold Demsetz (1973), ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy’

2. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1981), ‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’

3. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), ‘On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits’

4. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande and Steven C. Salop (1987), ‘Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law’

5. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1992), ‘Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power’

6. Benjamin Klein (1993), ‘Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak’


A Oligopoly and Collusion

7. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’

8. Donald F. Turner (1962), ‘The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal’

9. Richard A. Posner (1969), ‘Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach’

10. Franklin M. Fisher (1989), ‘Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View’

11. Jonathan B. Baker (1993), ‘Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory’

B Horizontal Mergers and Joint Ventures

12. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), ‘Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’

13. Janusz Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1983), ‘The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment’

14. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), ‘Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis’

15. Jonathan B. Baker (2002), ‘Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws’

16. Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece (1990), ‘Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust’

17. Carl Shapiro and Robert D. Willig (1990), ‘On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures’

Name Index

Volume II


Introduction The Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner


1. Aaron Director and Edward H. Levi (1956), ‘Law and the Future: Trade Regulation’

2. Frank H. Easterbrook (1984), ‘The Limits of Antitrust’

A Tying and Bundling

3. Ward S. Bowman, Jr. (1957), ‘Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem’

4. George J. Stigler (1963), ‘United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note of Block-Booking’

5. William James Adams and Janet L. Yellen (1976), ‘Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly’

6. Benjamin Klein and Lester F. Saft (1985), ‘The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts’

7. Michael D. Whinston (1990), ‘Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion’

8. Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’

9. Barry Nalebuff (2004), ‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’

B Resale Price Maintenance and Exclusive Territories

10. Lester G. Telser (1960), ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’

11. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’

12. Pauline M. Ippolito (1991), ‘Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence From Litigation’

C Exclusive Dealing

13. Howard P. Marvel (1982), ‘Exclusive Dealing’

14. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), ‘Contracts as a Barrier to Entry’

15. Eric Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer and John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991), ‘Naked Exclusion’

16. Benjamin Klein and Andres Lerner (2007), ‘The Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty’


A Predatory Pricing

17. John S. McGee (1958), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case’

18. Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner (1975), ‘Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act’

19. Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1981), ‘An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation’

B Raising Rivals’ Costs

20. Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop (1986), ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price’

21. Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein (1996), ‘Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The Standard Oil Case’

Name Index

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