Written by a world-renowned expert in radar and electronic warfare, the book helps you develop state-of-the-art ESM systems designed specifically to exploit the vulnerabilities of modern radar. It also identifies and evaluates the latest ESM receiving equipment, and outlines advanced ECM methods, including monopulse deception, coherent radar jamming, and high-ERP generation. Other well-structured sections cover modern ECCM countermeasure techniques, the impact of new stealth technology on ESM and ECM requirements, jammer upgrading procedures, and much more.
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Chapter 1: Electronic Warfare-Threats,Requirements, and Principles
Electronic warfare (EW) is a military action whose objective is to control the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. To accomplish this objective, both offensive electronic attack (EA) and defensive electronic protection (EP) actions are required. In addition, electronic warfare support (ES) actions are necessary to supply the intelligence and threat recognition that allow implementation of both EA and EP.
Figure 1.1 depicts the formal military terminology and definitions associated with EW. These broadened definitions have evolved from former definitions where functions were called electronic countermeasures (ECM), electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), and electronic warfare support measures (ESM) . The new definitions envision an increased EA function including the use of directed energy weapons (lasers, microwave radiation, particle beams), antiradiation missiles (ARMs) and electromagnetic pulses (nuclear weapons destruction of electronics) to destroy enemy electronic equipment. The use of EP is also expanded to include not only protection of individual electronic equipment (ECCM), but use of such measures as electromagnetic control (EMCON), electromagnetic hardening, EW frequency deconfliction and communications security (COMSEC).
ES focuses on action taken for the purpose of near real-time threat recognition in support of immediate decisions involving EA, EP, weapon avoidance, targeting, or other tactical employment of forces. The key actions taken here are intercepting, identifying, analyzing, and locating enemy radiations. EM radiations are generally intercepted using sensitive receivers (i.e., ES receivers) that cover those frequency bands associated with significant threats.
Identification involves comparing the intercepted data against threat signatures stored in a threat library. Location is generally accomplished through a combination of spatially dispersed interceptions.
EA focuses on the offensive use of the electromagnetic spectrum or directed energy to directly attack enemy combat capability. It combines nondestructive actions (called "soft kill") involving electronic jamming and deception to degrade or neutralize enemy weapons with the destructive capabilities (called "hard kill") of ARMs and directed energy weapons. Jamming is defined as the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of EM energy for the purpose of destroying, damaging, or disrupting enemy use of the EM spectrum; while deception is defined as the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to convey misleading information and to deny valid information to enemy electronics-dependent weapons. In a tactical environment, jamming radiations are subject to enemy actions (i.e., ARM attack) and must be carefully controlled. Examples of tactical deception are the use of ARM decoys and the radiation of false emissions to deceive an enemy's signal intelligence (SIGINT) system.
The destructive capability of EA is a relatively new concept in EW. ARMs have been effective in recent conflicts and are the most advanced method of employing destructive EA. Directed energy weapons use lasers or high-powered microwave transmitters to either destroy or disable electronic equipment.
EP focuses on defensive EW for the protection of friendly forces against enemy use of the EM spectrum and also against any unintentional radiations from friendly emitters. Electronic masking, emission control, the use of wartime reserve modes (WARM), electronic hardening, and the integration of EW systems into overall spectrum management are examples of EP actions.
An integral part of EP involves measures taken to imbed various techniques (ECCM) into electronic equipment to make them less vulnerable to EA. These actions reflect the continuing battle between EA and EP designers whereby each side attempts to gain the upper hand over the other. In essence, this is a battle of resources, with the advantage going to the side that invests the most resources.
1.1 Information Warfare
Information warfare (IW) is a broad concept, embraced by the military, whose objective is to control the management and use of information to provide military advantage. Information-based warfare is both offensive and defensive in nature-ranging from measures that prohibit adversaries from exploiting information to corresponding measures to assure the integrity, availability, and interoperability of friendly information assets. Information-based warfare is also waged in political, economic and social arenas and is applicable over the entire national security spectrum under both peacetime and wartime conditions.
From the military viewpoint, IW (sometimes called information operations) is difficult to define and suffers from a paucity of conceptual and descriptive models, theory, and accompanying doctrine. As such, IW is a term that has come to represent an integrated strategy to recognize the importance of information in the command, control, and execution of military forces and in the implementation of national policy. A definition proposed for IW is: "Actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting adversary information and information systems while leveraging and protecting our own information and information systems"
The current revolution in military affairs is largely rooted in the explosive advances which occurred in information technology. Vast amounts of data can be assimilated, processed, and made available to military users, allowing precision weapons to be directed against long-range targets. Protecting the integrity of these data is a major objective of current IW activity.
The global information infrastructure is a worldwide interconnection of communication networks, computers, data bases, and electronic equipment that make vast amounts of information available to users. It encompasses a wide range of equipment, including computers, satellites, fiber-optic transmission lines, microwave links, nets, scanners, television sets, displays, cable, video and audio tapes, fax machines, and telephone lines. This equipment forms information systems that collect, process, transmit, and disseminate information.
IW capitalizes on the growing sophistication of, connectivity to, and reliance on information technology. It targets information and information systems in order to affect the information dependent process . Such information-dependent processes range from energy, finance, health, logistics, maintenance, transportation, personnel, control systems (e.g., air, sea, rail, road, river, pipeline, and canal transport systems), intelligence, command and control, and communications. All depend upon an assured availability of correct information at the time needed. Destroy or degrade the information or information service and the function is stopped or delayed. Exploiting this dependency relationship is the basis of IW.
As depicted in Figure 1.2, IW deals with a broad set of potential actions occurring in a timeline that involves both competitive (the introductory phase to military conflict) and conflict situations . In the competitive phase, IW allows national level objectives to be achieved without combat. It involves covert actions that occur invisibly to most observers. As the combat timeline moves into conflict situations, IW is implemented using command and control warfare (C2W). C2W is fought at the military level against military decision makers, command and control systems, and combat systems. Its objective is to avoid or limit combat warning to the lowest possible level. It is fought visibly with military systems using overt actions...
Table of Contents
|1||Electronic Warfare--Threats, Requirements, and Principles||1|
|1.1.1||Command and Control Warfare||5|
|1.3||EA Effect on Radar||13|
|1.3.1||The Effect of EA on Surveillance Radar||16|
|1.3.2||The Effect of EA on Tracking Radar||20|
|1.4||EA Effect on Communications||31|
|1.4.1||Communications Jamming Principles||35|
|1.4.2||EP of Communications Systems||36|
|1.4.3||EA Waveforms and Strategy||40|
|1.4.4||EA Against Military Communications Systems||44|
|18.104.22.168||Tactical Data Links||45|
|22.214.171.124||Tactical Communication Radio Nets||47|
|2||Advanced Radar Threat||63|
|2.2||Air Defense Radar||74|
|2.2.1||EP for Air Defense Radar||82|
|2.3||Phased Array Radars||99|
|2.4.1||Synthetic Aperture Radar||110|
|2.4.2||Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar||115|
|2.4.3||Space Time Adaptive Processing for Airborne Radar||116|
|2.5||EP Techniques for Surveillance and Tracking Radar||120|
|3||Modern EA Systems--Architecture, Types, and Technology||133|
|3.2||Operational EA Systems Architecture||138|
|3.3||EA Radar Jamming Waveforms||147|
|126.96.36.199||Noise Jammer Effectiveness||156|
|188.8.131.52||Repeater Jamming Equations||175|
|3.5.1||Issues in Support Jamming||184|
|3.5.2||Direct Digital Synthesis Jamming||187|
|3.5.3||Digital Radio Frequency Memories||188|
|3.5.4||Comparison of DDS and DRFM Support Jamming||189|
|4||EA Against Modern Radar Systems||201|
|4.1.1||Linear FM Pulse Compression||203|
|4.1.2||Phase-Coded Pulse Compression||213|
|4.1.3||EA Against Pulse-Compression Radar||219|
|4.2||Pulsed Doppler Radar||229|
|4.2.1||EA Against PD Radar||242|
|4.3.1||EA Against Monopulse Radars||262|
|4.4||Coherent Sidelobe Cancelers||279|
|4.4.1||EA Against Coherent Sidelobe Cancelers||287|
|5||Digital Radio Frequency Memory||293|
|5.3||DRFM Sampling Techniques||318|
|5.4||Direct Digital Synthesizer||322|
|5.5||Advanced DRFM Architecture||324|
|5.6||Voltage Controlled Oscillators||326|
|6||Electronic Warfare Support||333|
|6.1||Signal and Threat Environment||334|
|6.2||Parameters Measured by the ES System||336|
|6.2.2||Processing of Multiple Pulse Emitters||344|
|6.3||Advanced ES Systems||345|
|6.3.1||Advanced Receiver Systems||361|
|184.108.40.206||Acousto-Optic Bragg Cell Receiver||371|
|6.5||Probability of Intercept||386|
|7||Expendables and Decoy Systems||405|
|7.1||Design of Expendable EA Systems||409|
|7.2.2||Chaff Shielding Effects||420|
|7.2.7||EP Against Chaff||427|
|7.3||Infrared Missile Attack||429|
|7.3.1||IR Missile Seeker Fundamentals||434|
|7.3.2||IR Missile Detection Range||443|
|7.3.3||IR Missile Seeker Counter Countermeasures||448|
|7.3.4||Missile Approach Warning||451|
|220.127.116.11||MAW Using Pulsed Doppler Radar||453|
|18.104.22.168||IR Missile Countermeasures||459|
|8||Directed Energy Weapons and Stealth Technology||471|
|8.1||Directed Energy Weapons||472|
|8.1.1||High-Power Microwave Weapons||475|
|22.214.171.124||HPM Effect on Electronic Equipment||485|
|126.96.36.199||Laser Atmospheric Propagation||493|
|188.8.131.52||Laser Beam Control||495|
|8.1.3||Charged Particle Beam (CPB) Weapons||496|
|184.108.40.206||Rebalancing the Radar Equation||522|
|220.127.116.11||MTI Considerations for Stealth Targets||525|
|Appendix A||Radar Jamming Modeling and Analysis Tool||539|
|A.2||Program Discussion and Notes||542|
|A.4||RGJMAT Supporting Programs||573|