The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

by Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Overview

Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology—that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its parts. Using Plato's Meno as a starting point, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that it is less valuable than generally assumed. The book will appeal to students and professional philosophers in epistemology.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521037860
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	07/11/2007
Series:	Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	236
Product dimensions:	5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.55(d)

Table of Contents

Introduction; 1. The value of knowledge is external to it; 2. The value of true belief; 3. The value of justification; 4. Reliabilism, normativity and the special promise of virtue; 5. The Gettier problem and the value of knowledge; 6. Knowledge as irreducibly valuable; 7. Epistemic attitudinalism: semantic and pragmatic approaches; 8. Knowledge and understanding; 9. Conclusion; References; Index.